The Westminster State in Crisis

The doctrine of 'Westminsterism' is unlikely to solve it.

My recent book, Ministerial Leadership, is partly based upon an analysis of interviews with former ministers carried out by the Institute for Government. As I say in the book, the problems of the UK state can be glimpsed through these interviews – mainly in the way in which the system is orientated to short-term policies, and the incentives that exist against long-term thinking, which are highlighted particularly in the chapter on decision-making. The UK’s problems are systemic, and not the fault of an individual minister, though of course individual ministers can and do make mistakes in their own areas. Political incentives are often most attentive to the electoral short-term, to the next reshuffle, to the even shorter attention spans of the 24-hour media, social media and instant messaging, and the default to legislation is all too frequent. The logic of activism in the current system can all too often be displaced by the demonstration of activity, rather than delivery. Even the ministers most committed to the strategic and long-term have to address these short-term pressures.

Added to that, there has been a loss of the stewardship function that the permanent civil service was meant to supply. Organisational memory has been lost. Civil servants rotate jobs almost as quickly as ministers – sometimes more quickly. These concerns appear to be shared across the parties, as the interviews indicate and the recent Maude report suggests. Austerity has meant that officials have been under pressure like never before and official record-keeping has been undermined. The world of WhatsApp is not conducive to the effective recording of decisions.

Finally, of course, the populist imperative associated with Brexit and its aftermath has found easy enemies in a supposed Remain-supporting, obstructive ‘Blob’. This populist imperative has turbo-charged the long-standing ‘Armstrong’ doctrine that the civil service has no identity or responsibility separate from the government of the day, and some ministers and ex-ministers continually argue that civil servants should be mindful of that. This is the populist re-interpretation of the Westminster Model.

According to two prominent academic analysts, the key elements of the Westminster Model were that:

·      Parliament is sovereign

·      Ministers are accountable to Parliament

·      Civil servants are neutral and loyal to ministers

·      Decision-making power is located in the executive

·      Government is legitimized by a public-service ethos

·      The system of decision-making is secret

This summary perhaps underplays the role of the monarchy. The UK is a constitutional monarchy. UK ministers are Ministers of the Crown. Welsh and Scottish ministers act on behalf of the Crown.

The Westminster Model was incorporated in the 2010 Cabinet Manual which had its roots in both radical and conservative ambitions. Radical, in that the late-stage Brown government was beginning to think more expansively again about the UK Constitution. Conservative, in that there was a real concern about the politicization of the Crown in the context of a possible hung parliament, and a consequent determination to write down accepted convention and practice. The practice of what I call ‘ministering’ operates in this constitutional context. I doubt that there will be a simple re-set of the relations between ministers and civil servants on the basis of the Westminster Model, whether as myth or practice.

Some argue that recent events show that the British system, based around the Westminster Model, dealt with two maverick prime ministers, and the system is therefore robust and in good health. I do not share that view. The traumas of recent years are the consequence of accumulated capacity failures in the system over the last forty years, accelerated by the consequences of the global financial crisis of 2007-9 and the austerity years which succeeded it. The short tenure of recent prime ministers is not a sign of the system re-asserting itself, and immense damage has been done in that period.

It seems unlikely that the Westminster Model will be reconstituted on the basis advanced by Lord Butler in 2022, following Sir Tom Scholar’s sacking by the Truss government, that the civil service is Her (now His) Majesty’s Civil Service, with the unspoken implication that it has an independence and a duty beyond any one government. It may be that new statutory powers are needed to define the boundaries between ministers and officials, making it clear where responsibilities lie, what is the appropriate stewardship role of the civil service for the long-term, beyond the lifespan of any one government, and how ministers can more effectively ensure delivery of their goals. Reliance on old Westminster myths may be reassuring but that is no protection against the techno-Darwinian populism of the social media age. In my view, the Westminster Model reheated will ultimately be defeated.  Instead, a new consensus is likely to be needed, underpinned by legislation, that enshrines the stewardship role of both public servants and ministers.

Lord Butler’s constitution does not exist. It is a set of myths and conventions, an enduring narrative of the Westminster Model of the constitutional monarchy, encoded in the Cabinet Manual and Ministerial and Civil Service Codes. Determined, focused and ruthless activity can displace its checks and balances, as we saw in the 2019 prorogation of parliament and what followed. The ‘good chaps’ no longer rule and self-satisfied mandarin-speak cannot disguise that. Trust has been lost. The damage will be permanent unless steps are taken to enshrine a new settlement in legislation. I am not overly optimistic that such changes are likely. I suspect that the reality will be more messy: some new form of muddling through.

The empirical material demonstrates that there is widespread if sometimes half-hearted acceptance of the Westminster Model amongst politicians of all parties. We might call this ‘Westminsterism’, a form of thinking about the UK constitution forged in the practice of parliamentary and governmental relations. While all former ministers indicate their support in some way for the accepted Westminster Model and the respective roles of ministers and officials, there is evident and arguably mounting concern about several aspects of the ways in which it is working, such as the inadequacies of organizational memory, the incentives against long-term thinking and planning, including risk, and the lack of focus on delivery and implementation skills

It seems fair to say that the political right has had a stronger emphasis on ways to re-balance the Westminster Model in the direction of executive sovereignty and ministerial control over decades - than the political left, which has largely defended the balance of the existing Model, although introducing some de facto challenge through the creation of the delivery agenda and of devolution.

But the Westminster Model, and its predominance, limits a more orderly discussion about the balance post-devolution of relationships between central and devolved governments, the system of governance in England and many other issues. The logic of activism, and the emergence of the delivery-minded minister, now challenge the Westminster Model as it has been conceived and re-constituted over time. It is not clear that the current Labour opposition yet has plans for significant reform.